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CREIGHTON C. HORTON II (#1542)
Attorney at Law
Petitioner, Pro Se
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1016
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CREIGHTON C. HORTON II#
Petitioner,

No. 920273-CA

-vsPriority No. 15

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,
Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

POINT I
RESPONDENT'S ASSERTION THAT LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY SUPPORTS ITS POSITION IS INCORRECT
Respondent in its memorandum focuses only on selected portions
of the relevant retirement statutes in an attempt to bolster its
argument that Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-203 (1992) is unambiguous and
mandates

that

petitioner

be

forced

into

the

noncontributory

retirement system because he transferred from the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office to the Attorney General's Office.

Respondent's

assertion that the other retirement statutes cited by petitioner
are not relevant to whether petitioner is entitled to remain a
member of the contributory retirement system is an effort to

dissuade the court from examining the entire statutory scheme and
to

focus

attention

Respondent's

brief

upon

merely

cites

no

an

isolated

supporting

portion

authority,

of

it.

whereas

petitioner's brief cites authority for the proposition that in
ascertaining

legislative

intent,

courts

should

consider

all

statutory provisions, seek a construction which harmonizes all
portions, and avoid a construction that rests on an assumption that
the legislature intended to do unfair, unjust, or unreasonable
things.
Respondent

in

its

memorandum

incorrectly

states

petitioner attempted to effectuate a legislative amendment.

that
In

fact, petitioner merely inquired of Senator Kay Cornaby, the
sponsor

of

the

original

legislation

establishing

the

noncontributory system, whether the legislature intended to force
those in petitioner's situation into the new system, as had been
represented

to

petitioner

by

the

Board.

In

response

to

petitioner's inquiry and not upon his solicitation, Senator Cornaby
sponsored legislation which would have clarified that employees in
petitioner's position could elect to remain in the contributory
system.

Respondent and petitioner agreed to suspend petitioner's

case until after the legislative session, in case the bill's
passage resolved the issues in his case.
Respondent incorrectly characterizes the failure of the bill's
passage as evidence of legislative intent in its favor. It is not.
As the Stipulation of Facts provides, and respondent acknowledges,
the bill passed in the Senate but was not called up or even

2

considered by the House. Since the bill was not considered, it was
never acted upon, nor was any vote taken.

Respondent's brief

inconsistently acknowledges that the bill was not considered in the
House and then argues that such a failure somehow demonstrates
legislative intent.

The bill's failure to reach consideration in

the House is no greater indication of legislative intent than is
the fact that it passed without opposition in the Senate.
PQINT 11
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS THAT PETITIONER'S RIGHTS
HAVE NOT VESTED OR, ALTERNATIVELY, THAT HE HAS
RECEIVED A "SUBSTANTIAL SUBSTITUTE" FOR THE
BENEFITS TAKEN FROM HIM BY THE BOARD'S ACTION,
ARE WITHOUT MERIT
Respondent's argument that^^petitioner's retirement benefits
have not vested because he has not satisfied all conditions
precedent to retirement begs the question. Certainly if petitioner
is forced into the noncontributory system his benefits will not
vest

until

retirement.

The primary

difference

between

the

retirement systems is that, in the contributory system, amounts
contributed by the employer vest immediately to the employee's
benefit, while in the noncontributory, vesting does not occur until
retirement.

This is statutory and not a question of Board

interpretation.

Utah Code Ann. § 49-2-301 (1992).

Implicit in

respondent's argument is the notion that at any time up to the
point of retirement it may change the rules of the game.

This is

inconsistent with Utah's approach that pension benefits are not
mere gratuities, but are contractual

in nature, and that no

substitute may adversely affect the employee's vested rights.

3

The argument

that

the noncontributory

system provides a

substantial substitute for the loss of the 6% vested contribution
made by the employer under the contributory system is disingenuous.
The Legislature did not take the "substantial substitute" approach
when

it

originally

enacted

the

legislation

establishing

the

noncontributory retirement system. If it had, it could have simply
provided

that

all members

of

the

contributory

system

henceforth be forced into the noncontributory system.
took into account

employees' vested rights, and

would

Instead, it
specifically

provided that any current member of the retirement system, whether
a state employee or an employee of a political subdivision, had the
absolute right to not be forced into the new noncontributory
system, a system in which the employee's right to continually
vesting contributions would be cut off.

It is disingenuous to

suggest that a 1.5% employer contribution to a 401(k) program (as
opposed to 6% actively vesting under the contributory system) and
a three-year rather than five-year final salary averaging for a
benefit

determination

if

one

retires

in

the

system,

is

a

substantial substitute for the benefits one receives under the
contributory system.
POINT III
RESPONDENT'S ASSERTION THAT RESOLUTION #86-15
IS CONSISTENT WITH ITS POSITION IS ERRONEOUS
Respondent strains to differentiate petitioner's situation
from those employees who left the employ of political subdivisions
and "enter[ed] full-time employment with the state" after the
effective date of the act, but who were treated as transferees by
4

Board Resolution #86-15.

Respondent in its memo states that

"...the only reason that Respondent allowed employees who changed
employment during the election period to consider the change in
employment as a 'transfer' was to preserve the election period of
those employees, which was statutorily guaranteed for a period of
six months after the effective date of the act..."

(Respondent's

brief, pp. 10-11).
This analysis is inconsistent because, under respondent's
interpretation, no employee entering employment with the state
after the effective date had any statutorily guaranteed right to
elect between systems. Indeed, respondent justifies its action in
petitioner's case on the ground that unambiguous statutory language
mandates that any employee who voluntarily elects to move from one
unit of government to another loses all protection against being
forced into the noncontributory system.

The entire thrust of

respondent's argument is that the statute is clear and unambiguous,
and mandates such action.

Yet respondent cannot get around the

fact that it accomplished by resolution that which it now claims is
strictly prohibited under the statute, namely, allowing one who
transfers employment from a political subdivision to the state
after the effective date of the legislation to be treated as a
transferee rather than as a new employee.
The statute itself is silent on rights of transferees,
creating the ambiguity which gave rise to Board Resolution #86-15.
This

statutory

ambiguity

is

one

respondent

now

refuses

to

acknowledge, although it concedes that the Retirement Act must be
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interpreted

liberally

in

petitioner's

favor.

Respondent's

unwillingness to concede the ambiguity which is evidenced by its
own resolution is contradictory but not surprising, since its
entire argument hinges on the premise that the statute clearly cuts
off the rights of transferees, an argument which its own resolution
belies.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing and the argument and authority
contained in the brief of petitioner previously filed, the decision
of the Board denying petitioner's request should be reversed and
petitioner should be allowed to remain a member of the contributory
retirement system under the provisions of Section 2 of Title 49,
U.C.A., 1953 as amended, known as the "Public Employees' Retirement
Act.n
DATED this C* ~~ day of September, 1992.
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